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Note 
Does Section 7 of the Charter 
Protect the Right to be a Professional ? 
Julius H. GREY * 
This essay deals with the controversy concerning the limits of sec. 7 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Given that it does not bestow 
an untrammelled right to practise a profession, does this mean that all matters 
in the professional field are totally excluded? In Wilson v. Medical Services 
Commission, the B. C. Court of Appeal left a role for sec. 7 in professional 
matters. The decision has been contested by at least one commentator. The 
main thrust of this essay is to defend Wilson. 
Cet essai traite du débat concernant l'application de la section 7 de la 
Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés en matière professionnelle. Étant 
donné qu 'aucun droit absolu à pratiquer une profession n 'est conféré, peut-
on croire que toute la vie professionnelle est exclue de l'application de la 
Charte ? Dans Wilson c. Medical Services Commission, la Cour d'appel de 
Colombie-Britannique a laissé un rôle pour la Charte en matière professionnelle. 
Cette décision a été contestée par au moins un auteur. Le but de cet essai est de 
défendre le bien-fondé de l'arrêt Wilson. 
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Does sec. 7 ' of the Canadian Charter of Rights cover freedom to practise 
a profession or a calling ? 
Until 1988 a large number of cases appeared to hold that it did not.2 But 
those cases did not ask themselves whether in a case of total denial of such a 
right, a Charter issue might not arise. The cases were of two types. Firstly, 
they refuted claims of those who claimed an absolute right to practise a 
profession and thus almost an exemption from discipline.3 Secondly, they 
denied relief to those who lost a licence or a business interest.4 The issue of a 
total and arbitrary exclusion of someone from a profession, trade or from 
business in general was not contemplated. 
It can thus be said that the Courts, mindful of the refusal by the 
Canadian constitutional legislator to enshrine property rights alongside other 
basic rights, declined to extend the American traditional constitutional 
defence of liberalism to Canada.5 The relationship between the Canadian 
Charter and the American has been a complex one. In Regina v. Robson we 
read at p. 145 : 
It is of some interest that, as appears from some of the American authorities 
cited by Finch J., the suspension of a driver's licence has been treated as a 
deprivation of liberty under the United States Constitution. American decisions 
are not, of course, to be treated as conclusive and due regard must be had to the 
differences in wording between the two documents and in the history, traditions 
and attitudes between the two countries. Section 7, unlike the American clauses, 
does not guarantee the right to property. That right appears to have influenced 
1. Section 7 reads as follows : 
7. [Life, liberty and security of person] Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice. 
2. See Re Homemade Wine Crafts (Canada) Ltd. and A. G. B. C, [1986] 26 D.L.R. (4th) 468, Re 
Abbotsford Taxi Ltd. and Motor Carrier Commission, [1986], 23 D.L.R. (4th) 365 
(B.C.S.C.), Re Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd. v. H.M. T. Q. and Dofasco Inc., [1986] 
55 O.R. (2d) 522 (Ont. D.C.), Smith. Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. et al. v. Attorney 
General of Canada, [1986] 24 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (F.C.T.D.), Isabey v. Manitoba Health 
Services Commission, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 310 (Man. C.A.), Charbonneau v. College of 
Physicians & Surgeons of Ontario, [1986] 22 D.L.R. (4th) 303 (Ont. H.C.), Noyes v. Board 
of School Trustees. School District 30, [1985] 64 B.C.L.R. 287 (B.C.S.C), Beltz v. The Law 
Society of British Columbia, [1987] I W.W.R. 427 (B.C.S.C), Milk Board v. Clearview 
Dairy Farm Inc., [1987] 4 W.W.R. 279 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Quesnel, [1986] 24 C.C.C. (3d) 78 
(Ont. CA.). See also R.V.P. Enterprises Ltd. v. .4. G..S.C., [1988] 4 W.W.R. 726(B.C.C.A.) 
and Whitbreadv. Walley, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 313. 
3. See Belhumeurc. Le Barreaudu Québec, [1988] R.J. Q. 1526. But Jacques J. A. in his dissent 
(Que. CA.) clearly envisaged a sec. 7 application. Since, despite his doubts, Rothman J.A. 
did not have to answer the question, Jacques J.A. has not been contradicted on this point. 
4. See the cases in fn. 2. 
5. But, since the New Deal, the U.S. has been much less liberal than before. SeeL. M. FRIEDMAN 
History of American Law, 2nd Ed., New York, Simon and Shuster, 1985. 
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some of the American decisions on this question. On the other hand, there may, 
because of the provisions of s. 1 of the Charter which authorizes reasonable 
limits, be less reason to construe liberty in a narrow sense in Canada6. 
It is undoubtedly true too that the authors of the Charter did not intend 
to turn sec. 7 into a weapon against the welfare state or any of the social 
programmes which often7 define the difference between Canada and the 
United States.8 Undoubtedly, it was fear of such a result that has inspired 
most of the restrictive interpretations of sec. 7. It would be both technically 
incorrect and improper for the courts to attempt to undo regulations. The 
refusal to defend particular business interests, contracts or jobs, even significant 
ones, is laudable. No one can seriously question it. But does this eliminate all 
possibility of protection, even in the case of extreme measures ? 
1. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of British Columbia9 
The cases prior to 1988 were silent because the precise issue of total and 
arbitrary deprivation of a right to practise did not arise and there is an 
established rule against gratuitous pronouncements on the Charter when 
there is no need for the solution of the dispute before the Court.10 All of those 
cases, which denied sec. 7 relief, dealt with particular jobs, licences, or with 
disciplinary proceedings which were, in fact, fair. The paucity of precedent or 
arbitrary confiscation of professional rights should not surprise anyone 
because drastic arbitrary limitations of individual freedom are fortunately 
fairly rare in our society. 
However, in the eighties the perceived over abundance and poor distribution 
of doctors pushed at least two governments, British Columbia and Quebec, 
into drastic action. In Quebec, foreign medical graduates were subjected to 
restrictions quite independent of any examination of their credentials. A first 
battle, Dlugosz v. A- G. Quebec > ' ended with a victory for the foreign doctors 
but only on administrative law grounds. A new retroactive law was passed 
6. R. v. Robson, [1985] 19 C.C.C. (3d) 137 (B.C.C.A.) per Esson J.A. Earlier, in a separate 
opinion, Nemetz C.J. had applied Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville [1972] 405 U.S. 156. 
7. Along with bilingualism of course. 
8. If one were to try an historical analysis, one would certainly not "ascribe" a "conservative" 
liberalism to the Trudeau administration which drafted the Charter. To interpret the Charter 
as the entrenchment of economic liberalism would be historically false. 
9. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 97, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171. 
10. See Moysa v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board), [1989] S.C.R. 1572. 
11. Dlugosz c. A-G. Que., [1987] R.J.Q. 2311 (Que. CA.). 
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and the matter is now before the Courts.12 It was, however, British Columbia, 
rather than Quebec which turned out to be the initial battleground for sec. 7. 
In Re Mia13, McEachern C.J.C. granted an administrative law remedy, 
but also applied sec. 6(2) and sec. 7 14 of the Charter. At p. 414 he said : 
In view of this history I have no doubt that freedom of movement within the 
province for the purpose of lawful employment or enterprise, or for the practice 
of a profession, trade or calling by qualified persons in any community, is 
indeed a right properly embraced within the rubric of liberty. Practices which 
purport to limit or restrict that right are invalid and must be struck down unless 
permitted by the Charter. I5 
Instead of appealing, the government corrected the administrative law 
problems and tried again. It was more successful at first instance, for Lysyk J. 
strongly refused to follow Mia, supra, and upheld the new scheme of limiting 
geographically the rights to practise of British Columbia physicians.16 This 
decision was, however, reversed by the B.C. Court of Appeal. n 
The Court of Appeal recognized the legitimacy of regulation and the 
limits of any freedom. It discussed at great length the previous jurisprudence 
and upheld the principle that "purely" economic rights cannot be considered 
part of "liberty" as defined by sec. 7. 
It then considered the right to practise medicine and found that, although 
it had an economic component, it could not be seen as a purely economic 
right. The Court said : 
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the appellants are pursuing a mere 
economic interest in the nature of an income guaranteed by the government. 
The impugned enactments go beyond mere economic concerns or regulation 
within the profession. The appellants are all fully qualified and licensed doctors 
who have been excluded from pursuing the practice of their profession. It 
matters not whether the exclusion of the opportunity to practise is exclusion 
from practice everywhere in British Columbia, or exclusion from practice 
anywhere but specified geographic areas of the province. I8 
12. Jaeger c. A-G. Que., S.C. 500-05-010434-874. Taken under advisement on February 23, 
1990. It is unlikely that any decision would be final. Several days later, Boussetta c. 
Corporation Professionnelle des Médecins du Québec S.C. 500-05-010168-894 was taken 
under advisement by another judge. 
13. Re Mia and Medical Services Commission of British Columbia, [ 1985] 17 D. L.R. (4th) 385. 
14. The discussion of sec. 7 starts at p. 411. 
15. Id., p. 414. 
16. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C.. [1987] 3 W.W.R. 48. This is the most 
restrictive judgment in this area of Charter law. 
17. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C. supra, fn. 9. 
18. Id., p. 193(D.L.R.). 
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This violation was further exacerbated by the violation of mobility 
rights. Whether or not sec. 6(2) of the Charter guaranteed mobility rights 
within a province, one could not help including a component of mobility in 
liberty under sec. 7.19 
As a result, the B.C. scheme offended sec. 7 and the Court went on to find 
that it contravened the principles of fundamental justice. The province did 
not attempt to justify it under sec. 1. It applied for leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court, but this was denied.20 The Wilson21 case was thus definitively 
confirmed, at least in that context. But the controversy remained. 
It must be stated that Wilson has been generally followed. The Howard22 
case was the most eloquent example. Mr. Justice Huddard explained the 
previous jurisprudence, pointing out that no untrammelled rights to practise 
were conferred by Wilson21 and that the previous cases denying purely 
economic relief were still correct. He went on to say at p. 320 : 
A purely economic regulation will not touch the right to "liberty". Only when 
the right to liberty is touched is s. 7 engaged (I use the word "touch" advisedly 
given the significant difference in the French and English versions of s. 7). It is 
the continuing right to membership in a profession one is practising that 
engages concerns extending beyond the purely pecuniary, concerns so effectively 
expressed by the five judges who heard the appeal of Mr. Justice Lysyk's 
decision in Wilson that I need not repeat them. Once acquired, that membership 
is fundamental to one's human dignity and protected by s. 7. The most careful 
reading of Wilson and Mia [Mia v. Med. Services Comm. of B.C., (1985) 61 
B.C.L.R. 273, 15 Admin. L.R. 265, 16 C.R.R. 233, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.)] 
does not permit me to view them as confining s. 7 to the protection of a mobility 
right, as the Attorney General would wish. Counsel for the Attorney General 
concedes that I cannot find them wrongly decided, although he argues that to be 
the case.24 
Other cases which cited Wilson as authority include McPherson25, Re 
Maritime Medical Care Inc.26, and Law Society of Manitoba27. Mia2i 
19. But in Howard v. Architectural Institute of British Columbia, [1990] 40 B.C.L.R. (2d) 315, 
Huddart J. refused to limit Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9, to 
"mobility" cases. Of course, even if one held professional rights not to be subject to sec. 7, it 
would still be possible to save Wilson as an entrenchment of mobility rights. 
20. 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxvii. 
21. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
22. Howard v. Architectural Institute of B.C., supra, fn. 19. 
23. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
24. Howard v. Architectural Institute of B.C., supra, fn. 19. 
25. McPherson v. Institute ofChartered Accountants ofBritish Co/umMa, [1988] 33 B.L.R. (2d) 
348. 
26. Re Maritime Medical Care Inc. and Khaliq-Kareemi, [1989] 57 D.L.R. 505 (4th)(N.S.C.A.). 
This case is significant since it shows another Court of Appeal favouring the same line of 
thought. 
27. Law Society of Manitoba v. Lawrie, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 229 (Man. Q.B.). 
28. Re Mia and Medical Services Commission of B.C. supra, fn. 13. 
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which, if anything, went further then Wilson, was approved in many cases, 
notably Litwack29. Perhaps most significant is the approval of Mia30 and the 
broad language of Law Society of Alberta v. Black11. Finally, many cases 
reach conclusions substantially similar to Mia and Wilson without mentioning 
them32. 
In addition, a very recent case, International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union — Canada Area Locals 500, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 
508,515 and519 et al.33 strongly supports the B.C. Court of Appeal. Rouleau 
J. said at p. 25-26 : 
There are however , m a n y judic ia l s t a t ements of i m p o r t to the effect t ha t sect ion 
7 is no t confined t o mere f reedom f rom bodi ly res t ra in t and the s imple fact t h a t 
an al legat ion infr ingement of sect ion 7 migh t have an e c o n o m i c c o m p o n e n t 
would no t exc lude it f rom the p ro tec t ion of the sect ion. . . 
In Mia v. Medical Services Commission of British Columbia et al., (1985) 17 
D . L . R . (4th) 385 ( B . C . S . C ) , Chief Jus t ice M c E a c h e r n s ta ted wi th regard t o 
sect ion 7, at p p . 412-15, t ha t " there are some r ights enjoyed by o u r people 
inc luding the r ight t o w o r k or prac t ice a profess ion t h a t are so f u n d a m e n t a l t h a t 
29. Litwack v. La Commission Nationale des Libérations Conditionnelles F .C.T.D. T-2080-85 
(Walsh J.). 
30. Mia, supra, fn. 13. 
31. Law Society of Alberta v. Black,[l9&9] 1 S . C R . 591. Ofcour se , t h i s i s a sec . 6 case but when 
the Court approved the judgment of Kerans J.A., (1986) 3 W.W.R. 590, his words at p. 612 
should be given their full effect : 
The pursuit of a livelihood through a trade or calling has been, in Canada, accepted as an 
appropriate and vital human ambition, available to those of either sex who want or need to 
pursue it. Our tradition was admirably expressed by McEachern C.J.S.C. in Mia v. Medical 
Services Comm. of B.C. at p. 301 : 
... there are some rights enjoyed by our people including the right to work or practice a 
profession that are so fundamental that they must be protected even if they include an 
economic element... 
Rights we have enjoyed for centuries include the right to pursue a calling or profession for 
which we are qualified, and to move freely throughout the realm for that purpose. These are 
rights our people have always taken for granted. Who would question them until now? 
The Supreme Court decision in Black is replete with hints that a "liberal" attitude is favoured in defence of 
livelihood. 
32. See Taylor v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Saskatchewan,[\9&9]15S&sk. R. 153., Brand v. The 
Council of the College of Physicians of Saskatchewan, [1989] 77 Sask. R. 252, Douglas et al v. Sask. 
Human Rights Commission, [1989] 79 Sask. R. 44. 
One should mention, too, Pearlman v. Law Society of Manitoba Judicial Committee, [1990] 1 W.W.R. 
178. The M anitoba Court of Appeal dismissed a sec. 7 argument because the payment of costs, which was 
in issue, was a purely economic matter. By implication, other aspects of law practise would qualify for 
sec. 7 relief. The minority opinion, not contradicted on this point, states at p. 184 (per O'Sullivan J.) : 
In my opinion, it is now settled that deprivation of the right to practise law is an interference 
with liberty. Such interference can be justified under the Charter only in accordance with 
the principles of fundamentaljustice, which include substantialjustice as well as procedural 
justice. 
33. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union — Locals 500, 502, 503, 504, 
505,506, 508, 515 and 519 et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, F .C .T .D. T-2557-86, March 8, 
1990. 
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they must be protected even if they include an economic element...". That 
conclusion was confirmed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Wilson v. 
Medical Services Commission of British Columbia et al, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 1, 
wherein the Court stated at pp. 17-18 : 
To summarize : "Liberty" within the meaning of s. 7 is not confined to mere freedom from 
bodily restraint. It does not, however, extend to protect property or pure economic rights. It 
may embrace individual freedom of movement, including the right to choose one's 
occupation and where to pursue it, subject to the right of the state to impose, in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice, legitimate and reasonable restrictions on the 
activities of individuals. 
He then went on to quash a law which provided no imprisonment, but a 
fine and certain restrictions on labour union activity — not a concept 
strikingly different from professional rights. It is true that there was, in that 
case, a "possibility" of imprisonment under art. 787(2) of the Criminal Code 
but, unless the Charter is applicable to rights with an economic component 
this would have led not to the nullity of the labour legislation but to a future 
contestation of art. 787(2). There is thus no doubt that Rouleau J. strongly 
reaffirms the liberal trend of interpreting sec. 7. 
Two earlier cases had foreshadowed these developments34. The only 
case which did not apply Wilson35 did not disapprove it36, but rather found 
that there was entirely analogous binding Ontario jurisprudence. Moreover 
this was a typical collective bargaining issue of the type which is considered 
purely economic and therefore compatible with Wilson37. A Quebec case, 
Normand n is also perfectly consistent with Wilson39. In it, Forget J. says at 
p. 26: 
Le procureur du demandeur veut rattacher le droit d'exercice d'une profession 
au concept de "sécurité". La Cour d'appel a rejeté cet argument dans l'arrêt 
Belhumeur c. Savard. La Cour a déclaré que ce droit d'exercice ne pouvait être 
absolu.40 
34. Donald v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1984] 48 B.C.L.R. 210 (B.C.C.A.) and Re 
Branigan and Yukon Medical Council, [1986] 26 D.L.R. (4th) 268. 
35. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
36. Re Arlington Crane Service Ltd., [1989] 67 O.R. (2d) 225, (Ont. H.C.). 
37. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
38. Normandc.La Régie de l'Assurance Maladie du guéiec C S . Montreal, 500-05-012998-884. 
(1989-03-21) (JE 89-680). 
39. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
40. Normand c. Régie de l'Assurance-Maladie du Québec, supra, fn. 38. It is interesting that 
"security of the person" rather than the more usual "liberty" is invoked. While liberty seems 
to be the established rubric, a somewhat cryptic passage of A-G. Que. v. Irwin Toy Limited, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R.92atp. 1003 certainly suggests the possibility of a future for "security of the 
person". But this would be a distinction without a difference. 
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The inclusion of rights to a profession as a potential charter-protected 
right thus seems firmly established.4I 
2. Critique of the Development 
Was Wilson42 rightly decided ? It is submitted that it was, and indeed 
that any other decision would be an unreasonable limitation of the Charter. 
In a somewhat vehement critique, David Lepofsky asks that the case be 
ignored43. With respect, the learned author makes two errors which prove a 
fatal flaw to his reasoning. 
First, at the outset, he assumes that Wilson44 grants an absolute right to 
practise a profession or to hold property rights. The opposite is true. Wilson45 
specifically upholds regulation and discipline; it explicitly approves the 
"property rights" cases. In fact, many cases which follow Wilson and approve 
it, in fact deny relief on the grounds that the regulation either does not violate 
the right to liberty or does not violate fundamental justice.46 
Secondly, he assumes that Wilson47 contradicts previous jurisprudence, 
especially that originating from Ontario. This is not so. The previous 
jurisprudence is reaffirmed and clearly all the earlier cases would likely have 
been decided in the same way. Thus, Wilson is neither a radical departure nor 
a panacea for the dissatisfied professional. What it does is state categorically 
that here, as in almost all walks of public life, there is a limit beyond which the 
Charter will not allow authority to operate. One can hardly see the interest of 
anyone to defend the right of provinces to take away someone's entire 
livelihood in an arbitrary or fundamentally unjust manner. 
41. A possibly incompatible judgment Archambault c. Le Comité de Discipline du Barreau du 
Québec, [1989] R.J.Q. 688 (CS.), Brassard J. seems to have been decided per incuriam. At 
p. 26 Brassard J. makes it clear that the "only" case cited in favour of Charter protection was 
Re Branigan and Yukon Medical Council, supra, fn. 34. Moreover, the facts seem to be of a 
type which, unless the procedure were judged to be arbitrary, would not be affected by 
Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B. C. supra, fn. 9, since the B.C. Court of Appeal 
explicitly recognized the rights of self-governing professions to discipline their members. 
Thus the incompatability may be more apparent than real. 
42. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
43. D. Lepofsky, A Problematic Judicial Foray Into Legislative Policy-Making, (1989) 68 
Can. B. Rev. 615. 
44. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
45. Id. 
46. See, for instance, Re Maritime Medical Care Inc. and Khaliq Kareemi, supra, fn. 26 and 
Howard v. Architectural Institute of B.C., supra, fn. 19. 
47. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
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There are two situations where the Charter protection might prove 
effective. Firstly, it will limit schemes to relocate professionals or totally 
restrict their rights such as the British Columbia effort which was struck 
down. Suppose that the doctor surplus pushes a government to deny access to 
"any" new doctor, including recent graduates or, arbitrarily, to suspend, say, 
the practice of 1988 graduates for several years. Surely ajudicial intervention 
would be in order. 
A similar example can be given with respect to property rights. If the 
original Quebec Civil Code articles 31-38 prohibiting, among others, members 
of religious orders from owning property were revived, would not the Charter 
have a role to play? And, would this affect the general rule that property 
rights, as opposed to rights to hold property, were not affected?48 
The second class of affected cases was suggested by Howard*9 and 
Khaliq-Kareemiso where disciplinary proceedings are not compatible with 
fundamental justice. Presumably, those will be rare, but there is no reason to 
rule them out in advance. 
After Andrews51 it is clear that removal of a professional for a discrimi-
natory reason52 would be struck. What, however, if without being discriminatory 
a procedure were arbitrary, totally devoid of natural justice or purely 
discretionary ? It would be absurd to deny relief in such a case. Sec. 7 seems to 
be the only reasonable legal basis for intervention. 
An example, here, will also be instructive. If a law allowed the Bar of a 
province to strike off the roll without notice any professional it deems 
unworthy, there would be no reason to shelter it from Charter review. Yet 
sec. 7 seems to be the only available weapon. 
Lepofsky argues that it is unfair to favour professionals over other 
workers. In his view this would be snobbish or elitist. Undoubtedly, no 
limitative list of professions exists. In Litwack " a "businessman" prevented 
by his condition of parole from engaging in "business' was granted relief. 
There is no reason why an arbitrary confinement of an "electrician" to a 
48. If any doubts remained about this, they should have been dispelled by Re Skalbania, [1989] 
60 D.L.R. (4th) 43 where the B.C. Court of Appeal without retreating one inch from Wilson 
v. Medical Services Commission of B. C, supra fn. 9. which it approved, refused to extend it 
to protect freedom to make particular contracts. 
49. Howard v. Architectural Institute of B.C., supra, fn. 19. 
50. Re Maritime Medical Care Inc. and Khaliq-Kareemi, supra, fn. 26. See also Re Branigan 
and Yukon Medical Council, supra, fn. 34. 
51. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
52. As happened in Martin v. Law Society of B.C., [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 (B.C.C.A.) long before 
the Charter. 
53. Litwack v. La Commission Nationale des Libérations Conditionnelles, supra, fn. 29. 
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specific town would not be actionable. Yet the professions have certain 
elements which do make them different. One must take into account the 
lengthy preparation required for joining them. More important, the monopoly 
of the professions makes it almost impossible for the person affected to 
pursue his calling outside the corporation. In Howard5* we read a perfectly 
plausible explanation of the favoured treatment of professions at p. 319 : 
The economic component in this matter derives from the essential nature of a 
profession. Each self-governing profession has been given a monopoly over the 
provision of specified services to the public. However well qualified to provide a 
particular professional service, a person cannot provide that service unless he is 
a member in good standing of the relevant professional society. A governing 
body regulates each profession as prescribed by the statute establishing the 
monopoly and the by-laws passed by the members. 
It would be a travesty, as well, to term the right to practise a calling or 
profession55 a mere economic interest. Wilson56 is surely right in connecting 
a person's pride, sense of well-being and dignity with such a right57. It suffices 
to read the Code of Ethics of almost any profession to see that membership is 
not seen only as a licence to make money. One should be astounded if many 
serious professionals joined Lepofsky in arguing the opposite. 
The mere presence of an economic element or interest cannot rule out a 
Charter application. At most, it may add nothing to enhance it. Many 
Charter-protected interests have an economic component. The equality rules, 
for instance, clearly apply to professions because of Andrews58 and have even 
been applied to employment59. Established instances of sec. 7 application, 
such as arbitrary deprivation of a driving licence60 also have an economic 
side. The word "economic" should therefore not become a sacramental 
formula for refusing relief. It may be helpful to applicants in some cases or be 
totally irrelevant in others but it cannot act as an automatic bar. Wilson^ 
clearly makes this point. 
The criticism of Wilson^1 is thus unfounded or based on a massive 
misunderstanding of the judgment. 
54. Howard v. Architectural Institute of B.C., supra, in. 19. 
55. This author does not exclude trades or limit the professions to the liberal ones. No elitist 
intention is present. 
56. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
57. As opposed to the right to practise in a particular law firm or hospital which is a "mere 
economic" incident of the right to practise, even if it involves matters of great value. 
58. Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., supra, fn. 51. 
59. Commission des Droits de la Personne du Québec v. Ville de Brossardet al, [1988] 2 S.CR. 
279 ; Canadian National Railways v. Action Travail des Femmes, [1987] 1 S.CR. 1114. 
60. R. v. Robson, supra, fn. 6. 
61. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
62. Id. 
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It is submitted that a desire to exclude a priori such an important part of 
human endeavour in the public sphere with potential effects on mobility and 
basic dignity, is a misreading of the many Supreme Court decisions which call 
for a broad purposive interpretation of the Charter63. Would not the Charter 
be a sterile and technical document if it protected us from confiscation of our 
driving licence64, and from relatively short imprisonment for non-payment of 
a fine65 but not from the confiscation of that which is probably one of the 
most important factors in a person's view of himself, his profession? Or, if it 
protected the right to merge of big law firms66 without giving any protection 
at all to a smaller practitioner who is typically confined to one province ? The 
flexible, open-minded approach of Wilson67 seems infinitely preferable. 
Conclusion 
The recent developments stemming from Wilson68 effect no revolution 
and reverse no established line of jurisprudence. They pose no threat to 
regulations of professions or any other aspect of Canada's welfare state. But 
they do establish that the right to practise a profession or calling may be 
protected by the Charter if threatened by arbitrary state action. This is the 
natural evolution of Charter law69 and, although it will change the outcome 
of relatively few cases it should be welcomed by everyone as another 
protection against arbitrary action which the Charter was intended to curb.70 
63. Law Society of Alberta v. Black, supra, fn. 31, Andrews v. Law Society ofB. C, supra, fn. 51, 
R. v. Edwards Book and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 
Reference Re Sec. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act B.C., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 487, Gamble v. The 
Queen, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 can be quoted as examples. See also Action Travail des Femmes 
v. Canadian National Railway Co. et al., supra, fn. 59. 
64. R. v. Robson, supra, fn. 6. 
65. R. v. Su«, [1988] 1 W.W.R. 385 (Sask. CA.). See also Reference re sec. 94(2), supra, fn. 58. 
66. Black v. Law Society of Alberta, supra, fn. 31 decided under sec. 6(2). 
67. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C., supra, fn. 9. 
68. Id. 
69. Even before the Charter Dickson J. as he then was, said in Kane v. University of B.C., [1980] 
1 S.C.R. 1105 at p. 1113: 
A high standard of justice is required when the right to continue in one's profession or 
employment is at stake. Abbott v. Sullivan, at p. 198; Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, supra, at 
p. 119. A disciplinary suspension can have grave and permanent consequences upon a 
professional career. 
In an extreme case, a Charter protection would seem proper. It is true that in R. v. 
Wrigglesworth, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 581 the Supreme Court passed an opportunity to decide the 
issue, but, given the Court's awareness of it, the failure to grant leave to appeal in Wilson v. 
Medical Services Commission ofB. C, supra, fn. 9, while not conclusive, cannot be deprived 
of all significance. 
70. In the Prostitution Reference, May 31, 1990, SC 20581, the majority of the Supreme Court 
«explicity» declined to decide the issue (per Dickson CJC). Therefore it remains open. 
